entitled "The Rules of Life by Eugene Stakhov," a former member of the OUN noted that "Stepan Bandera fought for an independent Ukraine, a democratic Ukraine with social justice, equality, where all the citizens were equal." It is noteworthy that after staying in the Donbass region, he appeared to be critical of the slogan of "Ukraine for Ukrainians" giving the ethnically diverse composition of the local population [3]. Is. Stakhiv believed that Bandera’s nationalism had no place in the Ukrainian ideology, because this ideology was supposed to be changed. Stepan Bandera, according to Is. Stakhiv, wanted to turn back to totalitarian regime that could protect the needs of the Ukrainian people. According to him, the OUN planned to form a national dictatorship, and thereby to conquer the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian nation. Is. Stakhiv noted: "Bandera wanted to return back to the totalitarianism that was absolutely negative and inadequate for the Ukrainian people. Therefore anyone who wants to build a monument to Stepan Bandera is the one who wants to go back to totalitarianism." [3].

Conclusion. Now, the sources of personal origin, namely, the memoirs, contain the information that particularly reflects the inner perception of each member of the OUN movement about Stepan Bandera’s historical figure to be discussed. These documents demonstrate the existence of certain differences regarding the methods of activity, but not towards the strategic objectives.

References


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TEN YEARS OF MODERN POLISH-UKRAINIAN HISTORY:

Introduction. The research showcases the changes in bilateral relations between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland after the “Orange Revolution” in the former and the ascension to the European Union in the latter. Said events (along with the changes in the primary political parties of both countries from 2005 to 2015) greatly
influenced the relations between two nations and led to new trends in their partnership, transforming it from the mere bilateral agreement to the one that is based on the multilateral structure of European Integration process and how Ukraine and Poland “fit” into it together. That is the objective of the paper is to discuss the factor of European integration within ten years of modern Polish-Ukrainian history (2005-2015).

The primary sources for the research are bilateral treaties between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland (such as the Agreement between the Republic of Poland and Ukraine on Social Security, May 18, 2012), as well as one-sided documents, both Ukrainian and Polish (such as Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski’s proclamation of the Polish Foreign Policy Priorities 2012–2016, March 29, 2012) [1]. Scientific literature that was overviewed during the research includes the works of both Polish (such as J. Draus’s Polish-Ukrainian relations after independence, T. Kapuśniak’s Polityka Polski wobec Ukrainy, etc.) and Ukrainian (such as S. Hrabovsky’s Яка Україна потрібна Польщі?, B. Andrushkiv’s Україна і Польща – економічні аспекти співпраці etc.) historians, economists and journalists. Information from multiple news media was also used [2; 3; 4, pp.59-62].

Following the research of sources and literature, it can be seen how Poland’s ascension into the EU and the Schengen Area put difficulties on the Polish-Ukrainian cross-national cooperation, while also shaping Poland into Ukraine’s main partner on the “arena” of the EU integration process. In the meantime, changes in the Ukrainian political scene from 2005 to 2015 also influenced Polish-Ukrainian relations, giving Poland reasons to be cautious about close cooperation with Ukraine and mindful of its own interests in relation to how Ukraine can fulfill its mission of EU integration, thus justifying Poland’s own new position as one of the vanguard supporters of the new European Eastern Partnership program [5, pp. 135-144].

Overall, the ten years period brought out great changes in the Polish-Ukrainian cooperation. The office of the president strengthened its powerbase in both countries, which corresponded to the fact that the presidents themselves (with more power in their hands) began to concentrate their attention less so on the problems of shared history, and more so on economic issues and European integration, effectively ignoring the controversy associated with historical events (while the parliaments of two countries still remained dead-set on fulfilling their ideas of historic justice, which can be seen with the latest proclamations of both the Polish Sejm and the Verkhovna Rada in, correspondingly, August and September 2016).

Poland as the Schengen member-state, Poland as the leader of the Eastern Partnership has become less interested in signing a large number of bilateral agreements with Ukraine and, as can be seen in the number of bilateral documents (or lack thereof) in 2011–2012 gradually transferred from bilateral relations with Ukraine to mediation of its status within the EU’s structures. A number of processes, including those regarding a yet another anniversary of the Volyn’ tragedy are happening right now, which makes it impossible to make a final conclusion on the Ukrainian-Polish relations of 2015. Only time will tell what new developments of the Ukrainian-Polish relations will come to a level of confrontation – although the signs
point to the prospect of these events being overlooked by the President of Ukraine and the ministers, while the MPs are continuously growing in anger and impatience.

**Conclusion.** Thus, it is argued that, regardless of the continued declaration of strategic partnership with Ukraine in 2012’s *Polish Foreign Policy Priorities*, the relations have shifted from primarily bilateral to more relevant to the European Union politics as whole, with Poland being able to use its influence in the EU as a bargaining chip to get Ukrainian cooperation, mainly that associated with the revision of shared history.

**References**


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**CONTRADICTIONS THAT HAVE ARISEN WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES**

*Introduction.* We have encountered a revolutionary breakthrough in the information sphere so far: information storage, processing and transfer have moved to a new, more improved level. Information technologies have absolutely changed the world. Any piece of information can be sent from one place to another immediately (with the exception of the state territories with limited functioning of the network).

Intermediaries between the audience and a source of information have disappeared. For example, for issuing some creative work and submitting it for the international community’s approval, it was necessary for a writer to find an editor,