

социуме / Абдуллаев Хабиб Мухамедович // Ислам в современном мире. 2020. № 2. С. 181–202.

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WEST AND RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE: QUASILIBERAL LEVIATHAN

Introduction. Western leadership has historically been the result of a long process and the interaction of many factors, based on a successful model of social development, the core of which is the triad of individualism, market economy and liberal democracy.

The two visions of the West – as a cultural community and a community of highly developed countries – are interconnected, but in the context of the problems of modern world politics, the West is primarily a community of developed democracies, which has acquired diversity and institutionalization, including the form of security systems. Overcoming the entanglement of the West involves the harmonization of values and interests as factors of Western behavior in the international arena.

Review of recent publications. J. Ikenberry, N. Barma, P. Beinart, R. Lowry, and others gave largely substantiated answers to the questions posed. Drawing on their scientific work, the publications of other authors, and sources, we have attempted to elucidate the main aspects of the threat to the global security system that

has arisen as a result of the West's "confusion" over Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine.

The objective of the paper is to identify the causes of confusion and suggest appropriate actions to harmonize values and interests, and overcome the state of confusion in the West.

Results of research. Despite the brief euphoria caused by the collapse of the communist bloc, after the end of the Cold War, the West was finally able to comprehend the new threats and challenges to the world order. However, the West has not been able to offer effective responses to the specific manifestations of these threats. The main reason for this is the situation, which can be defined as "the entanglement of the West". First of all, it is a misunderstanding of the importance of Western leadership as a prerequisite for a stable post-Cold War world order.

In Western political discourse there is, on the one hand, a sober awareness of the nature and goals of Russia's aggressive policy on the world stage, as well as understanding of the need for adequate resistance to the Kremlin's encroachment on the ideological and institutional foundations of Western civilization.

On the other hand – the unwillingness to believe in the prospect of a large-scale confrontation with Russia, fear of nuclear Kremlin blackmail, the inertia of previous hopes for liberalization and democratization of Russia, belief in the invariability of comfort, prosperity and security on the continent [1].

The lack of harmony between values and interests has become an extremely dangerous source of destabilization in both Western societies and international relations. Now the main threats to liberal democracy come from within: populism and nationalism. In the international arena, the imbalance of values and interests in the behavior of the West is primarily manifested through the contradiction between two models of foreign policy: real politics and idealistic politics. The former is based on the protection of national interests and the balance of power [6], while the latter is based on a system of values and ideals.

"Do we have confidence in our values to protect them at all costs? Is there enough respect for our citizens to protect our borders? Do we have the desire and effort to preserve our civilization in the face of those who overwhelm and destroy it?" "These questions were raised by Donald Trump on July 6, 2017, referring to the Poles, but referring to the West as an obstacle [2; 5]. This is how democracies defined the goal of NATO in April 1949: "the protection of freedom, the common heritage and the civilization of their peoples, based on the principles of democracy, individual freedom and the rule of law" (North Atlantic Treaty).

At present, in the most generalized form, Western policy in the Russian direction is reduced to the formula of "containment of the Kremlin and readiness for dialogue." In particular, in the 2017 Annual Report of the Secretary General of NATO. It is emphasized: "The Alliance will continue to adhere clearly to a position based on a dual approach, which provides for strong deterrence and defense, complemented by periodic, focused and meaningful dialogue with Russia" [10].

It should be reminded that one of the attempts to determine the strategy in the Russian direction was the summit of EU foreign ministers (March 2016). The proposed package of five conceptual areas was as follows [9]:

- the condition for the normalization of relations with the Russian Federation is the unconditional implementation of the Minsk agreements;
- selective cooperation (“service for service”) with the Russian Federation on crisis management (Syria, the Middle East, the fight against ISIS, etc.) is possible;
- strengthening the EU's internal resilience;
- strengthening contacts with Eastern and Central Asian partners;
- assistance to civil society in RF100.

This plan looks more like a tactical scheme, which is a generalized statement of current practice.

But in this "service for service" game, Putin has a number of obvious advantages over Western leaders. First, the Russian President is not burdened by international treaty-legal "conventions" such as borders and treaties. Secondly, it has a unique, by Western standards, personal efficiency of decision-making and the unconditional support of other state institutions. Third, it is based on the tradition of utilitarian and uncontrolled use of human resources (secrecy of human losses of law enforcement agencies). Fourth, it has a level of support from citizens that Western leaders do not have. And this in the presence of reliable and effective mechanisms for providing public support [7].

Of course, Western sanctions against Russia have a significant "deterrent" effect that the Kremlin leadership cannot ignore. However, in almost five years, Western sanctions have not significantly changed the overall nature of the Kremlin's aggressive foreign policy or the situation in the eastern Ukraine.

The Western world is experiencing a shortage of strategic approaches to Russian policy. It is a question of forming adequate and effective means, mechanisms and policies of opposition to the Russian "hybrid" expansion. And this is perceived by the Kremlin as impunity and encouragement to take action. On the example of Ukraine's case, we can note the ineffectiveness of conflict resolution methods due to the deterrence and obstruction of intermediate and intermediary institutions of Western foreign policy.

Conclusion. It is quite clear that the harmonization of interests and values in politics is not easy. It is especially difficult to implement in the politics of a diverse world, characterized by subjects of different social (cultural and civilizational nature), guided by a wide range of values and interests, when underdeveloped countries have access to technological capabilities of developed countries, including weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless, the first step towards the conceptual harmonization of values and interests and overcoming the state of confusion may be the West's awareness of the need to protect and preserve its own existence.

The problem is to effectively overcome the contradictions between real politics, the source of which is Leviathan, and the propagated liberal values of a declarative nature.

Only the West, combining the features of a high development level and a relatively high level of homogeneity, can serve as a key element of the new order. However, the West and its two institutional embodiments, NATO and the EU, lack a conceptual vision of a new world order, an effective strategy to counter new challenges and threats to international security [4].

Given the fundamental weakness of past international systems – overthrown by world wars and major economic shocks – the modern world needs to reform and rethink the liberal world order. An adequate Western response to specific challenges is possible only within the framework of a holistic collective strategic vision, which, in turn, requires a systematic understanding of the nature of post-Cold War international relations.

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