

At the same time, one should not forget that migration is an increasing process that has a cumulative effect. In other words, its growth causes further intensification of the process, as well as the formation of appropriate structures and networks for its organization. The globalization and intensification of Chinese migration, as well as its scale, have caused a lot of phobias and alarmists in the world.

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## **INFORMATION WARFARE IN THE BALTIC STATES AS RUSSIA'S «HYBRID POLICY» TOOL**

**Introduction.** One of the main components of a hybrid or non-linear war is the information-psychological influence operations aimed at the impact on target audiences and the manipulation of consciousness, the impact on emotions. Such operations are very harmful and dangerous [1]. They need to be fought situationally, but coherently using effective and adequate measures at the same time. A striking example of this is observed in the aggressive rhetoric of the Russian Federation. Moscow often moves from hostile words to aggressive actions – up to an outright lie in the form of propaganda at the state level, political and economic pressure, and sometimes even direct military aggression.

The countries of the Baltic region (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) represent a unique vulnerability due to their geographical proximity to Russia and the presence of the significant part of the Russian minorities. Experts believe that Russia is using these countries as a means of influencing NATO's ineffectiveness and in order to undermine the integrity of the EU [2]. Also, the Russian Federation is putting pressure on the governments and citizens of these countries to enable them to make certain political decisions that are beneficial to Kremlin.

**Review of recent publications.** The issue of information warfare in the Baltic States has been discussed in numerous works of the Ukrainian and foreign scholars: A. Kudors [3], E. Lucas [4], A. Radin [5], M. Winnerstig [6]. The complexity and versatility of the phenomenon of «hybrid politics», the complex nature of developing effective measures to counteract this phenomenon require an interdisciplinary approach and explain the diversity of possible aspects of the study. The issue of the «hybrid policy» of Russia has been considered by the Ukrainian researchers: Y. Magda, S. Fedina, Y. Panchenko.

**The objective of the paper is** to identify the main tools and methods of influencing the informational space of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

**Results of the research.** As defined by RAND Corporation, Latvia and Estonia are the most vulnerable to the Russian hybrid threats, as they have a common border with the continental part of the Russian Federation (apart from the Kaliningrad enclave) and quite numerous Russian minorities (Latvia contains 27% of population with the ethnic Russians, Estonia – 25%, Lithuania – 6%) [5].

The main purpose of Russia's disinformation in Estonia is to increase polarization and hostility between native Estonians and Russian-speaking citizens. Often this is achieved using historical themes. Such example of Russia's information and psychological company with an attempt to destabilize is «Bronze Night» in April 2007 in Tallinn [4]. It was then when many pro-Russian activists participated in creating destabilization in the form of the mass riots. All Russian media and a number of sites was involved immediately in that information campaign, where the

main channels launched aggressive information attacks against Estonia and the Estonians. So, the Russian disinformation campaign relied on a pre-existing network of the Russian-speaking Estonians who watched the Russian-produced content for the news [3].

The key difference between Lithuania and its Baltic neighbors is that the country does not have a significant number of ethnic Russians. However, the relative military weakness of Lithuania with regard to Russia leaves it vulnerable to the danger of the hybrid war and the «information war» associated with it. As recent CEPA analysis demonstrates, Kremlin disinformation campaigns directed at Lithuania highlight flaws in the West: low trust to Russia, alleged militarism and recklessness and the cost for Lithuania to be the front line of the possible east-west conflict [4]. The media strategy of Kremlin is mainly focused on historical events. The site Rubaltic.ru used the meeting of Pope Francis with the Russian Orthodox Patriarch in February 2016 to assert that Lithuania is culturally closer to Russia than the West, and covered the alleged negative aspects of the historical influence of Poland on Lithuania [6]. Thus, Kremlin propaganda describes Lithuania as civilizational country closer to Russia than to the West.

The influence of the Russian media in Latvia can be considered one of the most powerful tools. A significant number of Russians in Latvia and knowledge of Russian among ethnic Latvians allow the Russian mass media to reach a wide audience. Three Russian television channels were among the most popular in Latvia in 2011: RTR, First Baltic Channel and NTV Mir. All three are either directly or indirectly controlled by the Russian state [6]. The content of most Russian TV channels available in Latvia primarily focuses on the domestic audience of Russia, but it also affects the audience in Latvia. A typical topic for Russian propaganda in Latvia is focused on the Latvian Legion SS [4]. It was a small military formation of the Third Reich, which was formed in Latvia during the Second World War. Russia covers these historical facts in a completely different perspective, without providing complete information about this event, while Russian TV channels offer misinformation and distortion of historical facts.

**Conclusion.** As a result, Russian propagandists are determined to undermine NATO, the EU and the democracy of the Baltic region. They fueled the problem of discrimination against Russian-speakers. So, Russian media, disinformation, political manipulation, the organization of ethnic Russians through official and informal structures of the foreign policy have a significant impact on the Baltic States, as long as Russia can justify its military intervention under the pretext of protecting ethnic Russian minorities, as it was the case with the Crimea in 2014.

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## **MEMUARISTICS OF THE VERSAILLES SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEVELOPMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEOREALITY APPROACHES**

**Introduction.** In their attempts to understand the new system of international relations historians, political scientists and internationalists trying to find their optimal and effective conceptual support resorted to comparisons, the construction of historical parallels, and finding analogies with the past international systems. We can say that the Versailles system here serves as a benchmark, since the Paris Conference laid the foundations for the functioning of the first truly global system. At the same time, the question arises of what laid the foundation for post-war world order – the situational pragmatic interests of the victorious countries or the fundamental human democratic values? If to resort to the construction of historical parallels, then the dilemma of interests versus value and now largely determines the image of the modern world order. To answer this question, let's turn to memoirs, because, in my