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## **MEMUARISTICS OF THE VERSAILLES SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEVELOPMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEOREALITY APPROACHES**

**Introduction.** In their attempts to understand the new system of international relations historians, political scientists and internationalists trying to find their optimal and effective conceptual support resorted to comparisons, the construction of historical parallels, and finding analogies with the past international systems. We can say that the Versailles system here serves as a benchmark, since the Paris Conference laid the foundations for the functioning of the first truly global system. At the same time, the question arises of what laid the foundation for post-war world order – the situational pragmatic interests of the victorious countries or the fundamental human democratic values? If to resort to the construction of historical parallels, then the dilemma of interests versus value and now largely determines the image of the modern world order. To answer this question, let's turn to memoirs, because, in my

opinion, their subjectivity will help to identify those characteristic features of the process of world-building, which cannot be seen in official sources.

Therefore, the **objective of the paper** is to study the specifics of the formation of the Versailles world based on the analysis of the informative possibilities of memoir literature. This problem will be analyzed in the context of the neo-realistic paradigm, guided by the fact that, in combination with other theoretical and methodological approaches, it allows you to simulate the current situation in international relations in the time period.

**Results of research.** The analyzed memoirs make it possible to get acquainted with several key aspects of the formation of the Versailles system: the position of the member states regarding the system of punishment in Germany and the problem of institutional provision of the new order. So, in November 1918, D. Lloyd George stated that "an agreement that would violate the principles of righteous justice cannot be permanent. Let the example of 1871 be a cautionary for us. We cannot allow the principle of justice to celebrate a sense of profit or aggressive aspirations" [2: 37].

G. Nicolson, speaking of his feelings and mission in Paris, emphasized: "We traveled to Paris not only to eliminate war but also to establish a new order of things in Europe. We were preparing not just peace, but the eternal world. We were surrounded by the halo of the divine mission. We must be conscious, righteous, and ready for self-sacrifice, because we were bound by the fulfillment of the great, eternal and noble goals" [3].

Speaking about the inter-alliance conference in London in December 1918, D. Lloyd George points out that at the first meeting, the issue of prosecuting Kaiser was discussed. The British prime minister especially emphasizes the fact that in the last months of the war in France, which suffered the most from wars to atrocities, as well as in England and America, the public increasingly demanded the punishment of persons involved in atrocities that went beyond the cruelty that manifested in the course of hostilities. At the same time, the French in the agenda presented to the conference raised the question of "Responsibility for the war" rather than "Reparations". The British memoir testifies to the views of George Clemenceau on this issue, which did not insist on the physical execution of the Kaiser, but on transferring his case to the authority of the International Tribunal, announcing it out of the law" [2: 88-92].

H. Nicholson's reflections on mistakes made by the Paris Conference are also interesting. Referring to the contributions of the famous British diplomat and scientist E. Sato, H. Nicholson points out that for the success of any conference, there must be at least two minimum conditions: 1. A program of issues to be discussed by plenipotentiaries should be clearly defined; 2. All participants in such a conference must have a pre-agreed basis of positions to achieve a better result. At the same time, H. Nicholson emphasized that the Conference should preserve peace among allies [3: 81,126].

D. Lloyd George reminded in his memoirs that representatives of some states doubted whether it would be expedient at the current stage to create an organization with a permanent charter and the right to make decisions binding on independent

states of the world [2: 64, 516]. D. Lloyd George denies existing version, which was supported even by Colonel House, who, like no one, knew the true state of affairs in this area, that the US president, V. Wilson, had great difficulty persuading the Allies to join his 14 points ». At the same time, allies, before accepting Wilson's doctrine as a whole, required clarification of only two points out of 14: on freedom of the seas and reparation. The British prime minister scandal and widespread speculation that US President Wilson arrived in Europe as a lone Crusader to force governments to accept his idea of uniting nations [2: 81-82].

Memoirs also argue that President Wilson himself did not have a clear idea of the nature and role of a universal organization in the process of resolving disputes at the end of 1917. He also did not encourage discussions on this. The British prime minister even points out that in 1917 Imperial Germany put forward the proposal to create the League as one of the conditions of peace [2: 517, 520].

It is appropriate and demonstrative to compare the 14 points of Wilson with the 11 February 1918 annexed to them by the Four Big Principles and the 5th Condition of September 27 of the same year made by G. Nicholson in his work "How the World Was Made in 1919". He writes, "Our peace agreements were not developed openly; rarely such secrecy was preserved at other diplomatic meetings. Freedom of the seas was not secured. Instead of the foreseen establishment of free trade in Europe, tariff barriers were built up, higher and more numerous than ever. National armaments did not shrink. The German colonies were distributed among the winners in a way that cannot be called free and impartial. The reasons for the discrepancies and antagonisms were actually perpetuated [3: 52-53].

Thus, we can draw the **conclusion** that the features of the process after the military world-building are such that they are not fully understood, but the question of the dichotomy of value vs. pragmatic interests remain open to this day, since in the process of the Conference the question remained open to a different view of the "principles of solid justice" and "great, eternal and noble goals."

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## **GLOBAL SECURITY THREATS FOR THE PLANET**

**Introduction.** A continuing geopolitical rivalry between great powers such as the USA, China and other states as well as a complex international security environment perfectly heat up the global threats to the security on the planet [3]. On top of that, these threats were fueled by the Crimea annexation and an armed conflict in eastern Ukraine that was launched by Russian Federation in March 2014 [1].

**Review of recent publications.** The issue under consideration has been intensively studied by L.I. Shelley, A. Bellal, M. Calhoun, W.R. Mead and others.

**Results of the research.** In my opinion, here are some of the most topical global threats to the security on our planet in 2019.

*1. Armed conflicts.* Unfortunately, today many states have ongoing and violent armed conflicts that cause the civilian death toll around the planet. The present-day conflicts are ongoing in Syria, Ukraine, Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Sudan, Kashmir and so on. The Syrian conflict was the bloodiest according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Moreover, I think that the Ukrainian crisis was also the deadliest one, as it has taken so many lives so far, and no one knows how many it will take in the future.

*2. Uncontrolled migration.* There are lots of different reasons that can cause the uncontrolled migration globally. Namely, among those factors could be a search for a better quality of life or work, freedom from oppression, escape from armed conflicts